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Abstract—We develop a non-cooperative game-theoretic model
for the problem of graph minor-embedding to show that optimal
compiling of adiabatic quantum programs in the sense of Nash
equilibrium is possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The adiabatic quantum computation (AQC) paradigm [1]
is inspired by the physical processes known as quantum
annealing where one starts with a quantum system in its lowest
energy state and evolves the system “slowly enough” so that
the new state is also that of lowest energy. More specifically,
one initializes a quantum system so that its Hamiltonian HI
is in the lowest energy state, and then interpolates to a final or
problem quantum system with Hamiltonian HF via the AQC
program
H(t) = A(t)HI +B(t)HF (1)
with A(0) = 1, B(0) = 0 and A(T ) = 0, B(T ) = 1,
where T is the run-time of the program H(t). The value of
T determines if the solution to a problem obtained using an
AQC program is worthwhile in comparison to run-times of
programs on standard computers. The value of T is determined
inversely by the minimum spectral gap, which is the distance
between the lowest energy state and the next excited state of
the HamiltonianH(t). But this gap in turn may depend on how
the program H(t) is compiled for processing by an adiabatic
quantum processor [2]. In the following sections, we consider
the compilation of an AQC program as a type of network
creation game [4] and show that an optimal compilation of
AQC programs, in the sense of Nash equilibrium, is possible
via fixed-point stability.
II. ADIABATIC QUANTUM PROGRAMMING
Compiling an AQC program H(t) involves graph-theoretic
considerations that are dependent on the hardware structure of
the quantum processor. This is because the quantum hardware
is effectively a graph, hereafter referred to as the hardware
graph ΓH , in which the vertices represent qubits and the edges
represent interactions between the qubits. This specificity of
the quantum hardware is based on the fact that both HI and
HP are restricted in AQC to be of quadratic form, that is,
∑
i∈V
αiXi +
∑
(i,j)∈E
β(i,j)XiXj (2)
where E and V are respectively the set of edges and vertices
of the program graph, ΓP , that can be constructed from
H(t) by viewing it as a weighted adjacency matrix for ΓP .
Furthermore, αi and β(i,j) are elements of the set {0, 1}.
Compiling an AQC program is the process of mapping
ΓP into ΓH , where the variables Xi are taken to be the
qubits in the hardware graph and the binary nature of αi and
β(i,j) is used to specify whether the qubits Xi and Xj are in
use or not. In particular, the notion of minor-embedding [3]
is fundamental to AQC program compilation, as we discuss
furhter in the following section.
A. Compiling AQC programs
For the set of vertices and edges VP , EP respectively of
ΓP , and the set of vertices and edges VH , EH respectively of
ΓH , we make the following definitions.
Definition 1: An ideal compilation is a function f : VP → VH
such that if (u, v) ∈ EP then (f(u), f(v)) ∈ EH .
Definition 2: A non-ideal compilation is a relation
r : ΓP → ΓH such that
i) for v ∈ VP , r(v) is the vertex set of a connected
subtree Tv of ΓH .
ii) for (u, v) ∈ EP , there exists iu, iv ∈ VH such that
iu ∈ Tu, iv ∈ Tv, and (iu, iv) ∈ EH .
An ideal compilation of an AQC program is obviously one
for which the hardware graph has the smallest number of
edges for the quantum processor to process. We consider this
property to be a contribution toward saving processing time.
There can be any number of non-ideal compilations of the
program, but our goal here is to identify one which is optimal
in the sense of Nash equilibrium in a network creation game
given in [4]. The authors of this paper consider a given finite
set of vertices as the set of players whose strategic choices are
to identify an optimal subset of the players, so as to maximize
connectivity between the players while minimizing the cost
incurred in laying edges to establish the connectivity. We will
consider a variation of this game in section III. First however,
we review some essential game theory in the following section.
B. Non-cooperative Games and Nash Equilibrium
We start by defining a non-cooperative game with finitely
many player.
Definition 3: A N -player non-cooperative game is a
function
G :
N∏
i=1
Si −→ O, (3)
with the feature of non-identical preferences defined over the
elements of the set of outcomes O, for every “player” of the
game. The preferences are a pre-ordering of the elements of
O, that is, for l,m, n ∈ O
m  m, and l  m and m  n =⇒ l  n. (4)
where the symbol  denotes “of less or equal preference”.
Preferences are typically quantified numerically for the
ease of calculation of the payoffs. To this end, functions Gi
are introduced which act as the payoff function for each player
i and typically map elements of O into the real numbers in
a way that preserves the preferences of the players. That is,
 is replaced with ≤ when analyzing the payoffs. The factor
Si in the domain of G is said to be the strategy set of player
i, and a play of G is an n-tuple of strategies, one per player,
producing a payoff to each player in terms of his preferences
over the elements of O in the image of Γ.
Definition 4: (Nash Equilibrium) [5] A play of G in
which every player employs a strategy that is a best reply,
with respects to his preferences over the outcomes, to the
strategic choice of every other player.
In other words, unilateral deviation from a Nash equilibrium
by any one player in the form of a different choice of strategy
will produce an outcome which is less preferred by that player
than before. Following Nash, we say that a play p′ of G
counters another play p if Gi(p
′) ≥ Gi(p) for all players
i, and that a self-countering play is an (Nash) equilibrium.
Let Cp denote the set of all the plays of G that counter
p. Denote
∏N
i=1 Si by S for notational convenience, and note
that Cp ⊂ S and therefore Cp ∈ 2
S . Further note that the
game G can be factored as
G : S
GC−−→ 2S
E
−→ O (5)
where to any play p the map GC associates its countering set
Cp via the payoff functions Gi. The set-valued map GC may
be viewed as a preprocessing stage where players seek out a
self-countering play, and if one is found, it is mapped to its
corresponding outcome in O by the function E. The condition
for the existence of a self-countering play, and therefore of a
Nash equilibrium, is that GC have a fixed point, that is, an
element p∗ ∈ S such that p∗ ∈ GC(p
∗) = Cp∗ .
In a general set-theoretic setting for non-cooperative games,
the map GC may not have a fixed point. Hence, not all non-
cooperative games will have a Nash equilibrium. However,
according to Nash’s theorem, when the Si are finite and the
game is extended to its mixed version, that is, the version in
which randomization via probability distributions is allowed
over the elements of all the Si, as well as over the elements
of O, then GC has at least one fixed point and therefore at
least one Nash equilibrium.
Formally, given a game G with finite Si for all i, its mixed
version is the product function
Λ :
N∏
i=1
∆(Si) −→ ∆(O) (6)
where ∆(Si) is the set of probability distributions over the
ith player’s strategy set Si, and the set ∆(O) is the set of
probability distributions over the outcomesO. Payoffs are now
calculated as expected payoffs, that is, weighted averages of
the values of Gi, for each player i, with respect to probability
distributions in ∆(O) that arise as the product of the plays of
Λ. Denote the expected payoff to player i by the function Λi.
Also, note that Λ restricts to Γ.
In these games, at least one Nash equilibrium play is
guaranteed to exist as a fixed point of Λ via Kakutani’s
fixed-point theorem.
Theorem 1: (Kakutani fixed-point theorem) [6] Let S ⊂ Rn
be nonempty, compact, and convex, and let Γ : S → 2S be
an upper semi-continuous set-valued mapping such that Γ(s)
is non-empty, closed, and convex for all s ∈ S. Then there
exists some s∗ ∈ S such that s∗ ∈ Γ(s∗).
To be more specific, set S =
∏N
i=1∆(Si). Then S ⊂ R
n
and S is non-empty, bounded, and closed because it is a finite
product of finite non-empty sets. The set S is also convex
because it is the Cartesian product of the convex sets ∆(Si).
Next, let Cp be the set of all plays of Λ that counter the play
p. Then Cp is non-empty, closed, and convex. Further, Cp ⊂ S
and therefore Cp ∈ 2
S . Since Λ is a game, it factors according
to (5)
Λ : S
ΛC−−→ 2S
EΠ−−→ ∆(O) (7)
where the map ΛC associates a play to its countering set via
the payoff functions Λi. Since Λi are all continuous, ΛC is
continuous. Further, ΛC(s) is non-empty, closed, and convex
for all s ∈ S (we invite the reader to check that the convexity
of Cp is immediate when the payoff functions are linear).
Hence, Kakutani’s theorem applies and there exists an s∗ ∈ S
that counters itself, that is, s∗ ∈ ΛC(s
∗), and is therefore a
Nash equilibrium. The function EΠ simply maps s
∗ to ∆(O)
as the product probability distribution from which the Nash
equilibrium expected payoff is computed for each player.
III. NON-IDEAL COMPILATION AS A NON-COOPERATIVE
GAME
We wish to interpret the non-ideal compilation problem as
a type of network creation game, and use Kakutani fixed-point
stability to show that a compilation at Nash equilibrium exists
Recall that in this game, the players choose any subset of
vertices they wish to connect to. They can choose to build
connections with all the players, with some of the players,
or with none of them. However, if at the end of the game, a
player is not connected to all the others, he/she is penalized.
This is why even though it would cost a player to build a
connection, in some cases, not building one could cost more.
In the compilation game on the other hand, a player’s
strategy is to choose a subset of vertices in ΓH such that
a smallest possible subtree of ΓH spans this choice while
keeping Definition 2 true. This is because the penalty to the
players is defined in terms of the number of edges (which is
directly proportional to the number of vertices) in the subtree
it is mapped to.
Formally, the non-ideal compilation game is the function
C : S =
n∏
i=1
Si → 2
S → ΓH
where the countering sets are calculated using the cost (payoff)
function
Gi(s) = α · |Si| (8)
for player i, when strategy s ∈ Si is employed, and where the
cost of laying down one edge is α. Note that Gi are linear and
hence the countering sets will be convex. However, for Nash
equilibrium guarantee via Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, we
also need to ensure that the set of plays S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)
of the game is also compact and convex in the topological
space that it resides in, that is, R2.
Since each Si is a a tree inside ΓH ⊂ R
2, it is bounded; it
is also closed in R with respect to the relative topology and
hence closed in R2. Therefore, each Si is compact in R
2 and
hence so is S =
∏n
i=1 Si. The set S is convex only if each Si
is, or in other words, each Si is a line segment or a single edge
tree, in which case the Kakutani fixed-point theorem applies
and a Nash equilibrium exists in the game C.
To consider a larger class of pure strategies in the game C
for which Nash equilibrium may be guaranteed, extend S to
its convex hull Conv(S) which is compact by Caratheodory’s
theorem [7]. We now have fixed points for set-valued functions
F : Conv(S)→ 2Conv(S).
It is a basic fact in topology that any compact, convex subset
of Rm is homeomorphic to a closed ball Bm for all m. We
therefore have that Conv(S) ∼= B2 and
F : B2 → 2B
2
.
To get fixed points for functions
F : S → 2S
using F , construct a retract
R : B2 → S.
By definition, a retract has the property that R(v) = v for all
v ∈ S ⊂ B2. Note that
F(v) = F (R(v))
so that the fixed points of F lie in S.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We develop a game-theoretic formulation for compiling
adiabatic quantum programs and point out the overlap with
the minor graph embedding problem, which requires the
embedded graph to satisfy the connectivity of a problem graph
ΓP under the action of edge contraction. Our modification of
the network creation game emphasizes that each player must
now connect only to a subset of other players (nodes).
The problem of finding minor graph embeddings is dis-
cussed extensively in [8], [9]. One of the current leading
methods for finding minor graph embeddings is the algorithm
by Cai et al. [10] which is based on an adaptation of Dijkstra’s
algorithm to generate a sought-after embedded graph. This
so-called CMR algorithm starts by assigning two random
vertices in ΓP to random positions in ΓH and then finding
the shortest path between them. This process repeats, and with
each iteration, adds a new vertex from ΓP into ΓH and forms
paths that satisfy the connectivity. Embedded vertices may
also grow into paths, as needed, to satisfy the connectivity
requirements. The algorithm is probabilistic as it depends on
the starting vertices and the shortest paths created between
pairs. Consequently, for a give ΓH that is nearly the size of
the input graph ΓP , there is a significant probability that an
embedding will not be found for arbitrary connectivity of ΓP .
Our description of the compilation game is a first step
toward presenting the CMR algorithm as a specific instance of
the compilation game being played. By contrast, other current
methods for constructing embeddings use knowledge of the
connectivity of ΓH to synthesize ΓP , though even these can
certainly be related to the compilation game introduced here.
A future direction of this work would be to consider if there
exist alternative strategies in the compilation game that could
increase the likelihood of finding the Nash equilibrium, by
using for example the knowledge of the hardware connectivity.
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